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Abstract: This chapter attempts to explain the growth of labour productivity by
(inter)national spillovers from R&D and patenting. We develop a model that is
tested for Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America using a new set of panel data for the period 1955 until 1991. The
results indicate that domestic R&D has an indirect and, for Germany, a
positive impact on productivity growth.
1.  INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to explain differences in growth rates of labour
productivity across countries and over time by changes in technological
knowledge. Both formal economic theorists and empirical scholars have
always been interested in explaining economic growth, because it affects the
standards of living. On the empirical side, economic historians like David
(1991), Mokyr (1990) and Abramovitz (1991) are convinced that technology
plays a crucial role in explaining modern economic growth since the First
Industrial Revolution around the turn of the 18
th century. In their opinion,
technological progress is a path-dependent process, as it involves a learning
and feedback mechanism which depends on the specific characteristics of
the economy (Abramovitz, 1991). Furthermore, they found that the diffusion
of knowledge throughout the economy takes place only gradually (Salter,
1966) and that it varies across countries and over time (Gerschenkron, 1962).2
A second group of empirical scholars are the growth accountants like
Denison (1967) and Maddison (1995a). They try to calculate the contribution
of various economic factors, such as capital accumulation, on productivity
growth using a Solovian type of growth model. The unexplained part in this
model, the so-called Abramovitz Residual or Total Factor Productivity, is
sometimes labelled as “technical change” (Solow, 1957). Growth accounts
thus deal with technology as a purely exogenous variable. This does not help
to assess the role of technology in growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p.415-
416). Therefore a part of the productivity growth differences cannot be
explained within the growth accounting framework, and the residual remains
a “measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz, 1991).
In contrast, modern endogenous growth models attempt to endogenize
technology. They explain international growth differences by differences in
deliberate efforts to develop new products and technology. Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), Judd (1985), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1990, 1991),
Aghion and Howitt (1998) and others contributed to the development of
models in which imperfect competition with innovation-based growth
combined with learning-by-doing results in spillovers from industrial
research. These spillovers drive a wedge between private and social returns
on Research and Development (R&D). This is an approach which according
to Solow
“... has an air of promise and excitement about it...” (Solow, 1994, p.52),
since it models the interaction between technological change and labour
productivity growth. Most of this research is based on Schumpeter’s  notion
of creative destruction in which new technologies takes the place of existing
technologies.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it gives an explicit
application and estimation of an endogenous growth model at an aggregate
level. Second, it uses a new data set in which the time series of the variables
are internationally comparable. This chapter is organised as follows. Section
2 gives an overview of previous efforts to estimate the contribution of
technological change to productivity growth. The subsequent section is
theoretical in nature and focuses on the importance of knowledge
accumulation for long-run sustainable growth. In that section we develop the
benchmark model of growth and trade in which technology drives growth.
Section 4 describes the construction of the data, while Section 5 presents and
discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.3
2.  A REVIEW OF SPILLOVER STUDIES
Notwithstanding the encouraging development in formal theory, the
empirical basis of the new growth models is still very thin. Various authors
already tried to estimate the contribution of R&D to productivity, either in
levels or in growth rates and both at the micro and macro level. These
studies use different methodologies and data, so that the outcomes are
diverse and comparison is difficult. We will concentrate on the various
results and focus on international spillovers between industrialized countries.
The subject of international spillovers is interesting as knowledge diffuses,
however not necessarily evenly, across national borders by nature (Keely
and Quah, 1998, p.24). However, much of the literature deals with
intranational spillovers, i.e. inter- and intra-industry spillovers within a
country. Examples are micro- or meso-level studies like those by Wolff and
Nadiri (1993). The interest in international spillovers revived after Grossman
and Helpman (1991) emphasized the importance of openness and the
distinction between international and intranational knowledge flows.
Recently, the idea of geographical localization as applied in, for instance,
Jaffe et al. (1993) comes to the forefront again. However, evidence for
international spillovers remains relatively weak. Some authors even argue
that intranational spillovers exceed international spillovers significantly.
Lichtenberg (1992), for instance, finds that there are no complete, or no
instantaneous international R&D spillovers. Branstetter (1996) estimates
intranational spillovers (which exceed international spillovers) using
microlevel data. He shows that technological externalities can generate
multiple equilibria and that growth differences persist. This he considers to
support the assumptions of endogenous growth theory.
Despite the mixed results, the evidence tends to confirm the existence of
international spillovers. Many studies conclude that the contribution of
foreign R&D to domestic productivity is large. In a highly influential article,
Coe and Helpman (1995) find that, in a sample of 22 countries, both
domestic and foreign R&D contribute significantly to TFP growth.
Moreover, foreign R&D is becoming increasingly important, especially for
smaller countries. Finally, Coe and Helpman estimate large differences
between world-wide and own rates of return of R&D for the G7-countries:
about one quarter of the returns from R&D in these countries accrue to their
trade partners. These results are not undisputed, however. According to
Keller (1997a) the composition of imports, a measure that is used by Coe
and Helpman, plays no particular role in estimating positive and large
spillovers. He argues that this does not imply that diffusion of embodied
technology is not trade-related. In another paper, Keller (1997b) models
general spillovers versus trade-related spillovers from R&D. He calculates4
that 20 per cent of productivity growth due to foreign R&D is channelled
through international trade. He also finds that the contribution of foreign
R&D varies across countries, and that a country’s own R&D is more
important than that of the average foreign economy. Finally, Keller tries to
disentangle embodied and disembodied technology, but this appears to be
difficult to do. Technology can be embodied in traded goods and
intermediates, but can also flow disembodied as blueprints or ideas via
investments, or via international communication networks. In his opinion,
these alternative channels, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), should
be included in the analysis.
Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe (1996) include both inward and
outward FDI flows. The outward FDI flows are considered to proxy for
technology sourcing, which is often done by multinationals. Using part of
the sample of Coe and Helpman (1995) and employing an alternative
weighting scheme for foreign R&D, Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe
(1996) find that domestic R&D is important, especially for the larger
countries. This is similar to the result of Coe and Helpman, but the
elasticities to output are lower. With respect to foreign R&D, imports and
technology sourcing play a significant role while inward FDI does not. The
latter result may be explained by the fact that multinationals are aiming for
own benefits and not for international technology transfer per se. The rates
of return on foreign R&D are very high. Finally, the impact of technology
sourcing for many industrialized countries runs through the American R&D
stock rather than via imports from the USA.
On the industry-level, Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) examine R&D
intensive sectors in the USA and Japan and estimate their effects on each
other’s production structure and productivity. Over a short period of time,
R&D appears to be complementary to international spillovers for both
countries. However, over a longer period the results tend to differ between
the USA and Japan, with Japan’s R&D intensity decreasing. Furthermore,
American R&D affects the productivity growth of Japanese industries more
strongly than the other way around: 60 per cent of the productivity growth in
Japan is attributable to the American R&D, whereas it is 20 per cent in the
opposite case. Finally, private returns amount to about 17 per cent in both
countries and the social rates of return appear to be even 3,5 to 4 times
higher. These private returns to R&D are not out of line as can be seen from
Nadiri’s (1993) overview of empirical studies on rates of return to R&D.
Similar to Lichtenberg in his 1992-article, Park (1995) distinguishes between
government and private R&D. Park uses a panel data set (10 OECD
countries over the period 1970-1991) instead of cross-country data.
Furthermore, Park calculates the size of two kinds of spillovers, namely
spillovers into production and spillovers into research. Foreign R&D appears5
to spill over via the domestic production function to productivity growth.
This result is independent of whether the USA is included into the sample or
not. However, the effect of foreign R&D on domestic R&D is only observed
when American R&D is included. This is not surprising, as the USA carries
out the bulk of world R&D. Like Lichtenberg (1992), Park (1995) concludes
that once foreign private R&D is accounted for, foreign government-funded
R&D is insignificant to productivity growth. However, foreign public R&D
affects productivity growth indirectly via domestic private R&D, as public
R&D is often basic research which does not have a direct impact on rates of
growth.
Nadiri and Kim (1996) analyse the effect of R&D spillovers on TFP
growth in the seven largest economies (G7) in the period 1965-1991. They
criticize Coe and Helpman (1995) and Park (1995) in that they are not able
to distinguish the productivity effect of R&D spillovers from the factor bias
effect. The former occurs because R&D spillovers affects production costs,
the latter accounts for the effect of R&D spillovers on the other factors of
production. Furthermore, Nadiri and Kim account for country-specific
effects. The results indicate that benefits from spillovers differ across
countries, where domestic R&D is relatively important for the USA.
International knowledge spillovers from the USA to other countries is
sizeable, whereas less strong spillovers occur from those countries to the
USA, with some exceptions (Canada and Japan). It seems that the USA acts
as the technology leader. In narrowing the productivity gaps during the
period under consideration, the international spillovers appear to have played
a minor role. Furthermore, capital and R&D spillovers appear to substitute
each other, while domestic R&D and international spillovers complement
each other. Nadiri and Kim (1996) conclude that not only trade, but also the
absorptive capacity of a country to utilize foreign knowledge is crucial.
Other studies do not focus on R&D, but on (international) patenting
activity as a measure of knowledge accumulation and diffusion. Keely and
Quah (1998) argue that intellectual property rights, as a patent system, can
provide ex ante economic incentives although they generate ex post
inefficiencies (p.16). However, the exact nature of the relationship between
patents on the one hand and productivity and R&D on the other hand is not
completely understood. An appropriate approach would be to consider
patents as an output of the invention process generated by private R&D
(Keely and Quah, 1998, p.21-22). An empirical study with patent data is that
of Eaton and Kortum (1996). They argue that R&D expenditures are inputs
in the innovation process while patents are an indirect measure of research
output, and
“...where patent protection is sought reflects where inventors expect their
ideas to be used” (Eaton and Kortum, 1996, p.252).6
Eaton and Kortum (1996) use a cross-section of 19 OECD countries to
estimate a simultaneous equations model. The data they use to estimate
international diffusion are data of patent applications for the year 1988 in the
19 OECD countries. The patent applications are subdivided into the country
of origin of the inventor. They conclude that the levels (instead of the growth
rates) of productivity explain a country’s ability to adopt or innovate.
Furthermore, international diffusion rates are about half of the domestic
diffusion rates on average. They also estimate that the contribution of the
USA to productivity growth world-wide is sizeable, followed in size by
Japan and Germany. Germany affects European economies relatively
strongly, whereas Japan’s influence is observable elsewhere.
Notwithstanding the high rates of diffusion, barriers (e.g., in the institutional
area) are still large enough to let productivity differences persist. Finally, it
appears that human capital (in the form of education and research scientists
and engineers) is crucial for the ability to adopt, in addition to trade links and
distance (or geographical localization). The importance of human capital and
learning is thus confirmed again (see for instance, Benhabib and Spiegel,
1994). The results on trade supports the outcome of the study by Coe and
Helpman (1995) mentioned earlier. In another study using cross-section data,
Eaton and Kortum (1997) also include research (in particular, research
employment) into a growth model in addition to patenting activity in order to
explain productivity differences. This is a new step forward as the studies
discussed above do not incorporate both variables. Their results indicate that
foreign research is two-third as potent as domestic research. Furthermore,
the USA and Japan together are again driving the bulk of growth in the
sample (of five large industrialized countries).
To summarize, empirical studies on labour productivity growth and
technology produce various outcomes. Some of them estimate reduced form
equations or growth regressions in which technology is exogenous.
Caballero and Jaffe (1993) explicitly apply an endogenous growth model
using patent data. However, they do not consider international diffusion. The
challenge is to develop and test models that are capable of explaining
processes of growth and international spillovers. The mixed results of
empirical studies on economic growth
“...clearly underlines the need for growth economists to devote more time
to the construction of data...” (Crafts, 1997, p.60),
because the results of these studies are sensitive to the data used. For the
construction of proxies of the economic variables in the model, we
constructed a new data set for the USA, UK, France and Germany, and
present the resulting time series in Section 4. A detailed description of the
construction and the sources of the data is provided in the appendix.7
3.  MODEL
In this section, we formulate a model with international technology
spillovers and catch-up. The empirical studies discussed in Section 2 give a
handle on important research subjects. First, international technology
spillovers do take place and flow through different channels such as trade
and foreign direct investment. But these spillovers are, in general, not
complete. So growth differences will persist (Keely and Quah, 1998, p.26).
Nevertheless, spillovers from abroad seem to affect economic growth.
Besides, technology flows within a country (intranational spillovers) also
play a role in explaining productivity growth.
Second, both patenting activity as a proxy for knowledge flows and R&D
expenditures should be incorporated into an empirical growth model.
Cameron (1996) and Temple (1999) argue that in empirical applications the
Aghion and Howitt model needs to be extended with knowledge spillovers
from other countries. In this chapter we proxy these spillovers by patents.
Some studies discussed above indicated that domestic R&D is crucial in
order to be able to absorb new foreign technology. One of the results in our
estimations in Section 5 is that domestic R&D works indirectly on
productivity growth: a country needs a certain knowledge basis in order to
be able to adopt and learn from new knowledge from abroad in the form of
patents. Thus we may consider R&D expenditures as the input in the
innovation process and patents as the output (see Griliches, 1990). Note that
the R&D expenditures are privately-funded (business enterprise R&D). The
differences in patenting activity in the various countries can indicate whether
the national technological state of the art enables a country to catch up with
the “technological leader”, which in our case is the USA. Moreover, some
studies indicate that R&D in the USA affect other economies’ productivity
growth significantly, but not evenly across countries. We thus also account
for country-specific effects in our empirical research.
The model we use here draws heavily on Aghion and Howitt (1998,
Ch.12) and it is driven by product differentiation, quality improvements and
research spillovers. The underlying theory allows new intermediate products
to open up, as in Romer’s horizontal innovations model (Romer, 1990),
which are then subject to quality improvements as in Young’s vertical
innovations model (Young, 1998). In order to test the model using aggregate
data, it is shown that, with some convenient assumptions, the production
function on the aggregate level can be written as a Cobb-Douglas production
function. We discuss the underlying theoretical structure of the model in
detail in the appendix and discuss technological progress and the role of
spillovers in some more detail below.8
3.1  Production and capital
On the aggregate level, there is a stock of capital Kt embodied in machines.
New capital is produced at rate It. Gross investment It, consumption Ct and
research Nt are produced by labour Lt and intermediate goods xit:
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Variable  kt  is defined as the capital stock per efficiency unit of labour
Kt/(AtLt), where At indicates the average productivity of the economy, and Qt
is the number of intermediate goods that have been created in i industries.
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The flow of intermediate products is such that the ratio of Q over L is
constant. Capital-market equilibrium and the production function of final
output produce the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function. Finally,
defining gt as the growth rate of labour productivity  t t L Y ln ln D - D , the
basic equation in rates of growth is
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The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) is the rate of growth
of output per efficiency unit of labour f(kt), where
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as It/Kt. this can be written as:
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1 A sector in this model is defined as a certain kind of activity, such as doing R&D,
producing intermediates or final goods, carried out by an agent. The term sector is
sometimes used in a different sense, for instance in multi-sectoral models, in which each
good or intermediate i is produced in sector i. Here we prefer the term industry. In
empirical studies, a sector is part of the economy, such as the manufacturing sector, or at a
lower level, industries.9
3.2 Technological progress
In the R&D sector of each industry, innovations of size s occur at a rate ft
with a probability as determined by a Poisson distribution. These innovations
add to the stock of knowledge. The arrival rate reflects the probability of a
researcher to innovate the next blueprint for intermediate good i which
replaces the existing technology. The “leading-edge technology parameter”,










The technology of follower countries will evolve by own R&D efforts and
by technology spillovers from the leading country to the followers. This may
be interpreted as a limiting case of a more general model with mutual
technology spillovers (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p.421). The arrival of
new blueprints will gradually replace existing average technology At with the
leading-edge technology. So, the long-run change in productivity dAt/dt
equals the arrival rate of innovations times the average change of
technology:
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We may label W in equation (3) as the technology gap of the follower with
the leader country. We assume that W converges to a constant, say 1+s. This
implies that in the long run:
2
A A g g = ˆ .
2 Note that in the long run when gW=0, W=1+s.10
3.3 Empirical specification
Above it was assumed that the flow of innovations depends on the arrival
rate of innovations and the change of technology. In the remainder of this
section, we take a bit different approach to arrive at a testable specification
given the data available. In the process, inevitably, we have to make some ad
hoc assumptions.
Suppose, there are m countries each with its own level of technolgy A
 j.
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where 
 j is the importance of country j as a source of new technological
ideas for other countries, and Sj 
 j  =1. Suppose that country k is the
technological leader, then 
k =1. The weighting scheme 
 j  needs to be
known a priori, and it is assumed that for the countries considered here, the
USA is the technological leader.
As before, it is assumed that, in the long run, the technology gap
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This implies that, in the long run the growth rates of the technologies of the
leader and the followers must be equal:
A
j
A g g ˆ = .
Now suppose that the change in the level of technology in country j depends
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where the term between brackets on the right-hand side of equation (4) is the
gap. The last term is the rate of growth of the technology of the leader
country. Above we noted that in the long-run, when the gap is constant, we
expect b to be equal to 1.
3 Note that for follower country j, 0<W
j<1, so that z
j <0.11
Equation (4) is the empirical counterpart of equation (3) above. Parameter
l
 j  measures the speed of convergence of country j’s technology to the
leading-edge technology. We loosely assume that the speed of convergence




t n ln D + = g l l ,( 5 )
where  n
 j reflects R&D productivity. This captures the notion of the
theoretical arrival rates of innovation. The idea is that in order to adapt
foreign technology, more R&D is needed to upgrade the skill-level of
workers. It is likely that g is positive, since doing R&D increases knowledge,
either intentionally or by coincidence. Other factors than R&D that may
attribute to the process of adjustment are simply captured by the constant
term l in equation (5). One can think of organisational and managerial
factors and knowledge not embodied in own R&D and in patents.
The composite term l
j as determined in equation (5) is assumed to be
positive. If a country j lags behind in terms of technology, then a positive
value for l
j signals convergence to the leading-edge technology. For
practical purposes we quantify technology A
 j  by the number of patents and
the reciprocal of R&D productivity by the ratio of R&D expenses D 
j over
GDP Y
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The symbols have the following meaning:
j
t A the level of technology of country j
j
t A ˆ the level of technology of the leading country, here the USA
j
t g growth rate of labour productivity of country j at time t
j
t A g , growth rate of technology of country j at time t
j
t k g ,   growth rate of physical capital in efficiency units of country j at time t
j
t A g
, ˆ growth rate of leading-edge technology at time t, here the USA
j
t l speed of convergence of technology of country j at time t
j
t n g , growth rate of the reciprocal of R&D productivity of country j at time t
j
t D g , growth rate of R&D expenses of country j at time t
j
t Y g , growth rate of GDP of country j at time t
j
t i ratio of investment over capital of country j at time t
j
t L g , growth rate of employment of country j at time t
The first equation is the familiar log-linear Cobb-Douglas production
function. The second equation describes the development of technological
progress, which depends on the technological gap with the leader. The third
equation describes the speed at which the technological gap is closed. These
equations are the core of the model, the other equations are identities.
Substituting the identities and the convergence process in the first two
equations we arrive at two equations, one for the growth rate of labour
productivity and one for the growth rate of technology:
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Equations (6) and (7) will be estimated, but first we take a look at the data.13
4.  DATA
Testing formal models of the type presented in the previous section requires
accurate data, on for instance physical capital and R&D, which are often not
available on detailed level. Moreover, growth economists are interested in
long-run development for a broad selection of countries in different phases
of economic development, but internationally comparable and long time
series are not always available. Measurement problems are huge, see for
instance Griliches (1994), so we want our model to be as simple as possible.
We constructed proxies for the variables in equations (6) and (7) in order
to estimate the effects of technological change on labour productivity
growth.
The appendix shows a list of the variables, and the sources of the data
used. In the current section, we show the development of the mentioned
variables for the USA, UK, France and Germany in the period after the
Second World War. Figure 1a on labour productivity in the total economy
shows that France caught up with the USA during the period 1955 to 1991,
while in 1955 it ranked lowest with Germany. The growth rate of labour
productivity in France has always been positive in this period, whereas the
other three countries experienced some repercussions (Figure 1b). German
labour productivity has also increased fast, but it did not yet succeed in
catching up with the USA (at least not until 1991). The Anglo-American gap
remained relatively constant during the period under consideration.
Traditionally, physical capital accumulation has been assigned a crucial
role in economic development. Growth accountants like Maddison (1995b)
devote much time to the construction of data on capital stocks and
investment in order to account for the share of capital accumulation in labour
productivity growth. Figure 1c displays the growth of gross capital stocks.
From Figures 1b and 1c, we can hardly draw unambiguous conclusions on
the link between capital accumulation and labour productivity growth. Only
the differences in growth rates of the gross capital stock between the
countries are clear. Up to the early seventies, Germany experienced high
growth rates, whereas in the subsequent decade, the rates of growth for
France were larger. The British capital stock grew less rapidly, but in all
three economies the growth rates declined over time. The growth rates for
the USA are low on the average, but, given the size of the economy, the
level of its capital stock is higher. Furthermore, the growth rates suggest that





Figure 1. Total economy, 1955-199115
According to endogenous growth models, technological development
affects the national growth rates of labour productivity, and thus also
differences between countries. Capital accumulation then plays only a
supporting role. In our model in Section 3, technology is represented by
cumulative experience in creating new knowledge (proxied by business
enterprise R&D expenditures) and the speed of convergence towards the
leading edge technology (proxied by patent activity). Figure 1e shows the
growth rate of R&D expenditures-to-GDP ratio from 1956 to 1991 in total
economy. Before 1965, the growth rates of the R&D-to-GDP ratio were high
for France, with Germany a good second. Figure 1d shows that the
American-British R&D ratio remained relatively constant, while Germany
and France caught up to some extent. Especially French R&D grew fast
before 1965. The explanation for the fact that the American R&D
expenditures did not grow so fast may lie in its early development in this
area. Already before the 1950s, the USA was the first Western country to
start with systematical R&D. Furthermore, the pattern of growth in R&D
seems to be sensitive to the business cycle.
In Figure 2a, the yearly numbers of applications for patents (applications in
short) in each country (both foreign and domestic applications) are
presented. Applications for patents are made by inventors to the (inter-)
national patent offices. The idea behind the use of data on patents is that they
contain technological knowledge. Particularly, patents are the outcome of
innovation processes, whether or not starting with formal R&D, and
theoretically they should have an impact on labour productivity growth.
Grants are those patents (or new knowledge) that will effectively come into
use, but grant numbers are often sensitive to bureaucratic procedures at the
patent offices. Applications are no patents yet (i.e., grants), but they reflect
the possibility in which a country is ready to gain or adopt new knowledge.
The total number of applications represents also an element of
international knowledge spillovers. The countries under consideration are
trading and communicating with each other, so that their national knowledge
is spreading to other countries in some way. This diffusion takes place by
trading goods and intermediates, investing abroad (capital flows) or by
political and individual networks. Patents applied for by foreigners are also
playing a role. In this way a general knowledge pool emerges, which may
have a larger effect on the national growth rates of labour productivity than
national expenditures on R&D alone.16
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Figure 2. Applications, 1940-1991
Figure 2a shows that, as one may expect, the number of patents applied
for in the USA by American and foreign inventors is clearly higher than
those in the other three countries. The USA is attractive to patentees as it
represents a large, more or less uniform market. It is a market in which most
consumers show similar characteristics and demands, so that scale effects
from production based on new technology can be exploited very well and17
one may expect certain profits. Furthermore, a nation’s total number of
applications can reflect its relative strength in technology. Particularly, it
indicates a country’s ability to turn new knowledge locked up in applications
into economic growth. In the current chapter, the USA are considered as a
“technological leader”. The innovative effort of American firms and
individuals is significant, although the share of foreigners has increasing
during the period. The Anglo-American gap in applications is very large, but
France and Germany do not perform much better. The American-German
gap has even widened since the 1950s.
However, cumulation of patent numbers over a number of years is
supposed to reflect the knowledge level of a country more effectively, as
yearly numbers are very sensitive to the business cycle and some
bureaucratic problems or measures, such as the change in the international
patent law in the 1970s. Furthermore, we assume that patents from years ago
will need time to come into use as the knowledge incorporated in the patent
will have to be made concrete in products or production processes. So
patents of, for instance, 10 years ago can still have impact on today’s
economic performance.
Figure 2b displays the time series on the growth rates of the 10-year
moving sum of the number of applications in each country. All series show a
clear trend, with a decline starting already in the 1960s. The lowest point is
reached somewhere between 1975 and 1980. The French growth rates are
fluctuating relatively strongly, whereas the American rates are on average
lower than those of the other countries.
5.  EMPIRICS
In Section 3 the model is presented and the equations are derived. Here we
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We lagged the investment term to obtain a statistically significant effect of
investment on per capita income. Such a lag may be theoretically explained
by a “time-to-build” argument: it takes some time for investment to become
productive. This equation is estimated with iterative weighted least squares,
where lagged productivity growth is added as an instrument. The second
equation describes the development of technological progress, which
depends on the technological gap with the leader:18
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This equation is estimated using iterative SUR.
Both equations are estimated on a panel of annual observations. The
countries considered are France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America. The time period considered is 1957-1991. The
interesting parameters are the capital share in output a and, more
importantly, the parameters in the technological progress function: the R&D
effect on adjustment l, the non-R&D effect on adjustment g and the long-run
technology gap z.
5.1  Estimation results
From the estimation results presented in Table 1 we can draw the following
conclusions. First, the fit is not particularly good, especially not for the
productivity equation. However, the capital share is 0.21 which seems
reasonable. Second, most parameters are significant at a 5% significance
level, and all parameters have the expected sign.
More important are the estimations for the technology function. Here, we
present three versions: one equation with a common R&D effect l and a
common non-R&D effect g for all countries considered (the first column in
Table 1). The second equation (second column) allows the non-R&D effect
to differ between countries, while the third equation (third column) allows
both the R&D effect and the non-R&D effect to differ between countries.
From the results we can conclude that own R&D significantly affects the
speed at which countries adapt foreign technology for Germany only. For the
UK and France own R&D seems to be less important. Other, non-R&D,
factors seem to play a significant role in the adjustment process. These
factors matter for all countries considered. For France and the UK these
other factors are more important then own R&D.
Parameters z indicate the long-run technology level with respect to the
USA. In the theoretical model these relative technology levels were
supposed to be constant in the long run. From the estimation results we can
conclude that, in the long run, France has a level of technology of about 51%
(calculated from the first column in Table 1 as exp(-0.68)) of that in the
USA. For Germany and the UK these numbers are 67% and 63%,
respectively. These estimation results more or less are confirmed with the
data as can be seen from Figure 3. Note that there are sharp differences in
the data for the periods before and after 1970. Before the early 1970s relative
technology levels seem to converge, whereas after 1970, relative technology
levels more or less stayed constant or even dropped a little compared to the
USA.19





l  (common) 0.09 0.08
(6.63) (5.95)
l  France 0.09
(3.36)
l  Germany 0.12
(7.81)
l  UK 0.06
(3.38)
g  (common) 0.12
(1.56)
g  France 0.04 -0.04
(0.68) (-0.52)
g  Germany 0.53 0.47
(3.14) (2.91)
g  UK 0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (-0.20)
b 0.59 0.58 0.58
(5.66) (6.34) (5.50)
z  France -0.68 -0.63 -0.60
(-19.00) (-16.63) (10.11)
z  Germany -0.40 -0.38 -0.37
(-16.68) (-21.47) (-23.50)
z  UK -0.46 -0.43 -0.33
(-16.44) (-15.47) (-4.04)




a 0.32 0.31 0.25
Germany - 0.39 0.34 0.17
UK - 0.45 0.44 0.39
USA - N.A.




France 0.246 0.215 0.207 0.192
Germany 0.913 0.216 0.251 0.192
UK 0.719 0.132 0.119 0.105
USA 0.842 N.A. N.A. N.A.
a negative
b not applicable20
Figure 3. Technology gap vs. USA, 1949-1991
6.  CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we try to explain growth differentials across countries by
technological developments. It builds on recent endogenous growth models,
which combine imperfect competition with innovation-based growth and
learning-by-doing in innovation. These forces generate spillovers from
industrial research and patenting activity. Our model is a multi-country, with
international technology spillovers and catch-up. The model is tested for the
USA, UK, France and Germany using a new set of panel data for the total
economy in the period 1956-1991.
From the estimation results we can draw a number of conclusions. First,
most of the parameters of interest are significantly different from zero and
have the expected sign. Second, technological development in the form of
the growth rate of R&D expenditures and the growth rate of the gap with the
technological leader USA appear to play a significant role in the explanation
of the growth rate of labour productivity. Third, international spillovers do
occur between the four countries under consideration, but they do not take
place completely and not immediately, so that productivity growth rate
differences continue to exist. Four, the growth in R&D expenditures has an
indirect and positive effect via the adjustment of the gap with the USA only
for Germany. Domestic efforts to gain knowledge thus are important to some21
countries as a learning mechanism for the adoption of foreign technology
locked up in patents from abroad. Five, the diffusion of knowledge from the
USA to Germany, France and the UK differs. So, the technological gaps
between these countries and the USA also differ, and the growth rates of
productivity differ as well. The technology gaps converge over time,
implying that knowledge diffuses only gradually and varies across countries,
and that learning takes time. Finally, it may be expected (from estimations
not included in this chapter) that the results also differ between time periods.
Despite these interesting and intuitively plausible results, one has to bear
in mind that formal R&D expenditures and patenting activity do not capture
all forms of knowledge. Think of tacit knowledge, which is important in
some sectors of the economy. Furthermore, organisational and managerial
knowledge are not accounted for explicitly. Human capital accumulation is
only implicitly reflected in own R&D efforts, which appeared to be
significant for the adjustment process. In order to catch up, a country thus
needs a knowledge basis accumulated via learning-by-doing in the R&D
process. This argument may be tested if the model is extended with (the
effects of) skills. For reference on the complementarity between skills and
R&D we refer to, for instance, Colecchia and Papaconstantinou (1996).
To conclude, the results vary across countries, sectors and over time. This
is confirmed by other empirical studies (as discussed in Section 2) as well.
Crafts argued that ‘
“... success in ‘technology transfer’ varied and seems to have been
affected by institutional and policy differences...” Crafts (1997, p.64).
This corresponds with the concept of “ultimate” causes of economic growth
as defined by Maddison (1995a), and is also discussed by among others
North (1990), on reducing transaction costs, Abramovitz (1991), on the




We have constructed proxies for the variables in equations (6) and (7) for the total economy.
The original data used for construction of these proxies are discussed below. Note that total
(gross) investment and capital are the sum of non-residential structures and machinery and
equipment. Furthermore, the depreciation rate d was assumed constant in the model discussed
in Section 3. However, with help of the data on capital stocks and investments, we made time
series on the depreciation rate, which we used in estimation. The proxies used in estimation
are:
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where gY and gL is log-differenced GDP and employment, respectively,
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where gD is log-differenced R&D expenditures,
-  the growth rate of technology:
 
j
t A g ,
calculated as the log-difference of 10-year moving sum of the number of total
applications for patents in country j,




calculated as the log-difference of 10-year moving sum of the number of total
applications for patents in the USA,
-  the level of technology
j
t A 1 ln -
calculated as the log of 10-year moving sum of number of total applications for patents
in country j , lagged one year,
-  the level of technology of leading country
4  With special thanks to Bart van Ark (updated production and employment data), Angus
Maddison (standardised capital data), Bart Verspagen (updated R&D and patent data), and
Jan Luiten van Zanden (national patent office data).23
j
t A 1 ˆ ln -
calculated as the log of 10-year moving sum of number of total applications for patents
in the USA, lagged one year,
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where it is gross investment I divided by gross capital stock K and
() t t t
j
t K K I/ D - = d .
Output and employment
Data sources: Van Ark (1996, updated), OECD (1997b).
The time series for GDP are updated (production census) series from Van Ark (1996,
Appendix tables 1.2,1.3,1.8,1.9). These series are in constant national prices, but not based on
the same years. Table 3.4 from Van Ark (1996) gives the National Account equivalents for
the census data in the year 1975 and are constructed in such a way that international
comparison is meaningful (e.g., GDP is at factor cost, while the national census series are
sometimes at producer or market prices). Using table 3.4, the census series can be re-based to
the year 1975. As the data in table 3.4 are in mln US$, the PPPs given in table 3.3 can be used
to convert them back into national currencies. The scale factor is the ratio in 1975 of the
current value of GDP to the value at prices of the base year in the original series, both in
national currencies. After re-basing, the series are converted into PPP in 1975 from OECD
(1997b, table 3, p. 162).
In table 3.4 of Van Ark (1996), data are also given for the number of employees for total
economy. These data are somewhat different from the census employment data in 1975
(updated series from Appendix tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9), for the same reasons as above,
namely that definitions of GDP and employment differ between National Accounts and
national census series. Using the 1975 data on employment in both table 3.4 and the census
series, employment is re-scaled.
Capital stocks and investment
Data sources: Kravis et al. (1982), Maddison (1995b), OECD (1966, 1997b).
Time series for total economy on gross stock of fixed non-residential capital and gross
investment in 1990 national currencies at midyear are from Maddison (1995), tables 7 and 8
on Non-Residential Structures (NRS) and Machinery & Equipment (ME). Official data were
standardised by Maddison with respect to asset lives and retirement patterns. All asset lives
are as closely as possible to those in the USA, i.e., 39 years for NRS and 14 years for ME, and
all assets are scrapped when their expected life expires. The data were also corrected for war
damage. With the 1990 price index for Gross Fixed Capital Formation (OECD, 1997b, table
34, pp.146-147), the series were re-based to the year 1975. Data on prices before 1960 are
indicated by the price index on GNP (OECD, 1966, table on price index of GNP, p. 6). The
series were converted with 1975 PPPs calculated on the basis of data in summary tables 6.124
and 6.3 in Kravis et al. (1982, p. 167 and p. 179). Following Maddison (1995), the PPPs for
NRS are a weighted average of the PPPs for Non-Residential Buildings (lines 111-118) and
Civil Engineering Works (lines 119-122), with the weights being their per capita expenditures
in national currencies. PPPs for ME are from table 6.3 (lines 123-144). The resulting 1975
PPPs are displayed in the table below.






Technology indicators are the most difficult part of the data construction. In the current
chapter, R&D expenditure time series and data on patent numbers are applied to proxy the
growth of knowledge in the economy.
Research and development
Data sources: OECD (1995b, 1997b), Verspagen (1996, updated).
The time series for Research and Development (R&D) in current national prices for total
economy were from updated data of Verspagen (1996). Some gaps in the series of Verspagen
(1996) were filled with ANBERD data from OECD (1995b). The OECD data and
Verspagen’s data namely do not differ when compared for other years, so that the data may
not differ much for the years at which only OECD data are available. After filling the gaps as
far as possible, only data for the UK in 1970 and 1971 could not be filled in.
The series are converted for each country into 1975 PPP$ using the 1990 price index for
GDP (OECD, 1997b, table 31, pp.144-145) and the GDP PPPs of 1975 in table 3 on p. 162 in
OECD (1997b). Special R&D price indices would be preferred, as “such special price indices
indicate a higher rate of inflation for R&D than in the economy at large” (OECD, 1984, p.
309). So R&D growth rates calculated from time series converted with GDP indices may
appear to be too optimistic. The use of GDP PPPs also reflect the relative purchasing power
parities only broadly. Unfortunately, R&D indices or PPPs are not available for the present.
Applications for patents
Data sources: Deutsches Patentamt, I.N.P.I., OECD (1991, 1995a, 1997a), WIPO (1983).
The sources for data on the total number of applications for patents are:
-  All countries from 1973 onwards: OECD (1991, table 20) for 1973-1974, OECD (1995a,
table 20) for 1975-1987, OECD (1997a, table 73) for 1988-1991.
-  France before 1973: I.N.P.I. for 1962-1972; WIPO (1983) for 1940-1961.
-  Germany before 1973: Deutsches Patentamt for 1949-1972; WIPO (1983) for 1940-
1943.
-  UK and USA before 1973: WIPO (1983) for 1940-1972.25
MODEL
Consumers maximize utility over an infinite horizon given their budget constraint. They
derive utility from a set of differentiated products. Basically the model is a multi-country
model. In each country we have three sectors:
5
1.  An R&D sector producing blueprints (or patents) for new products i using primary
resources and previous accumulated knowledge A, home and abroad.
2.  An intermediate-goods sector with a total number of Qt industries. In each industry a
monopolist holds a patent to the latest generation of differentiated product xit, and uses
capital Kit as described in the simple production function for intermediate goods:
it it it A K x / =
Here Ait is the productivity parameter of latest version of intermediate product i. We
assume that successive vintages of the intermediate product are produced by increasingly
capital intensive techniques. This implies that productivity Ait increases over time.
Finally, profit maximizing behaviour implies that all producers of intermediates i supply
a common amount of output (see below and Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 95).
3.  A consumer-goods sector producing final output Yt using technology, labour Lt and
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where Qt is the number of differentiated products. Brands xit substitute well for each
other: the elasticity of substitution between every pair of available brands e = 1/(1-a)>1.
Resources devoted to R&D which improve the quality of existing products (vertical
innovations) contribute over time to productivity in the production of final goods as well as to
the stock of knowledge. Imitation of ‘old’ products increases the number of differentiated
products Qt (horizontal innovations) but does not add to the social knowledge pool. Although
in reality horizontal innovations do occur (increasing variety), the productivity effects of such
innovations are not as clear as those of quality improvements. Despite increased possibilities
to specialize and satisfying a variety of needs, more variety increases also complexity of
production and thereby errors. Moreover, thin-market transaction costs will arise. To sum up,
innovation generates growth and imitation spreads the research input over more sectors.
To avoid the scale effect of R&D (doubling the number of workers in research does not
double growth rates, see Jones, 1995, and Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 404-405), the number
of sectors Qt grows at the same rate as the number of workers Lt , that is Lt /Qt is constant.
Basically, it is assumed that imitation is a serendipitous process. This means that imitation
just happens: no one spends resources attempting to imitate. The flow of imitation products
can now be written as:
5  In our model, multi-country spillovers only matter in the specification of technological
progress, so we introduce the index denoting a specific country when we discuss
technological progress.26




The coefficient x is called the “imitation rate”. The number of workers per product Lt /Q t
converges asymptotically to a constant lº Lt /Q t.
6 Each sector requires Kit = Aitxit units of
capital, and capital-market equilibrium requires equality between supply and demand of
capital:
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Profit maximizing action implies that all sectors produce the same amount of output, i.e. xit=
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Define the capital stock per efficiency unit of labour as ktº Kt /(At Lt). The common amount of
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6 If  dQt /dt=x Lt and dLt /dt=gL Lt, where gL is the rate of growth of the number of workers,
then dQt /Qt = dLt /Lt implies that x l=gL.27
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